150 Years of Japanese Beer: The Epic Rivalry of Four Brewing Giants

Research Period: May 2026 | Sector: Food & Beverage / Beer Industry | Research Type: Industry + Company Research Method: Horizontal-Vertical Analysis

I. One-Sentence Definition

Japan's beer industry is a mature market heavily dominated by four giants — Asahi, Kirin, Suntory, and Sapporo — with a combined CR4 of 94%. This report focuses on the three with the longest intertwined histories: Asahi, Kirin, and Sapporo, whose 150-year rivalry has encompassed consolidation and breakup, shifts in market leadership, and category revolutions. Suntory, the fourth giant that surged to prominence after 2000 (18% market share in 2023), is woven into the narrative where relevant. Today, these companies face a triple squeeze — a shrinking domestic market due to an aging population, the 2026 tax unification, and substitution by canned cocktails (chuhai) — forcing them to shift their growth engines overseas.

---

II. Vertical Analysis: From Origins to the Present

2.1 The Black Ships and Beer Arrives in Japan (1853–1889)

The story of Japanese beer begins with a black ship.

In 1853, Perry's fleet forced open Japan's doors. What flooded in with the Westerners was not just steam engines and firearms, but also a golden, bubbling liquid. The Japanese had been drinking sake for centuries and had little taste for this bitter foreign import. But the Meiji Restoration made "leaving Asia and joining Europe" national policy, and drinking beer became a symbol of civilization and modernity.

In 1870, an American named William Copeland opened the Spring Valley Brewery at Yamate 46-ban in Yokohama — the first modern brewery on Japanese soil. Its historical significance lay in proving that Japan's climate and water could support beer production. Although the brewery changed hands several times, its DNA eventually flowed into Kirin's veins: in 1885, Mitsubishi's Iwasaki Yanosuke took over and founded the Japan Brewery on that foundation.

In 1876, the government stepped in. Nakagawa Seisaburo, who had studied brewing in Germany, established the Kaitakushi Beer Brewery (開拓使麦酒酿造所) in Sapporo under the Hokkaido Development Commission, using Bavarian-style brewing techniques. The name "Sapporo" came from the cold-brewed beer produced there; the North Star on its label was the emblem of the Hokkaido Development Commission — a name that would one day become an iconic brand.

In 1888, the Japan Brewery brewed its first beer. Shoda Heigoro proposed using the mythical Chinese beast "Kirin" as the trademark. That May, the first Kirin beer went on sale. In 1889, the Osaka Beer Brewing Company (大阪麦酒会社), the predecessor of Asahi, was established, with Torii Kumakichi as president. After the Suita factory was completed in 1892, beer was officially sold under the "Asahi" brand.

By this point, the prototypes of Japan's beer Big Three had all appeared: Sapporo in 1876, Kirin in 1888, and Asahi in 1889. Notably, in the 1890s, domestic beer production first exceeded imports — meaning local brewing capability had firmly taken root.

2.2 Dai-Nippon Beer: Monopoly and War (1906–1949)

The Japanese beer market at the end of the Meiji era resembled today's internet industry — after the land grab came the big fish eating the small.

In 1901, the government imposed a barley beer tax under the pretext of military construction, a rate so high that small breweries simply could not survive. Five years later, in 1906, Osaka Beer, Nippon Beer, and Sapporo Beer merged to form Dai-Nippon Beer Corporation (大日本麦酒株式会社), with Magoei Kyuhei as president, commanding over 70% market share. A monopoly.

Kirin did not join the merger and became Dai-Nippon Beer's sole rival. One dominated the market, the other held its ground — forming Japan's earliest "duopoly." A Springer academic paper notes that despite extremely high market concentration, Boone regression analysis revealed competitive behavior among Japanese beer firms — not pure monopoly.

Several details from this period are worth noting:

In 1900, Asahi (then still called Osaka Beer) launched Japan's first bottled draft beer and won the Grand Prix at the Paris Exposition. Winning on the international stage demonstrated that Japanese brewing had already reached a considerable standard.

The 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake destroyed Kirin's Tokyo factory, forcing it to rebuild in Yokohama. In 1937, Takahashi Ryutaro became president of Dai-Nippon Beer — a man who was simultaneously the founder of the Japanese Society of Hygiene. A hygienist running a brewery subtly foreshadowed the Japanese beer industry's later obsession with "purity" and "cleanliness."

In 1943, war shattered everything. Beer was prohibited from having independent trademarks, and the Sapporo brand vanished. Dai-Nippon Beer was forced to switch to military production.

In 1945, defeat arrived, and so did MacArthur. The occupation forces enforced the Deconcentration Law — essentially antitrust. In 1949, Dai-Nippon Beer was cleaved in two: Asahi Beer (朝日麦酒) was assigned western Japan, and Nippon Beer (日本麦酒, later renamed Sapporo Beer) was assigned eastern Japan. Kirin remained independent — the only Japanese beer giant to survive the postwar era without being broken up.

This split shaped the competitive landscape for the next half-century: Asahi held Kansai, Sapporo held Kanto, and Kirin covered the whole country.

2.3 Kirin's Forty-Four-Year Reign (1954–1998)

The first half of Japan's postwar beer history was essentially Kirin's one-man show.

When the 1949 split occurred, Nippon Beer (Sapporo's predecessor) led with a 38.7% market share. But this advantage did not last. In 1953, the three companies were tied. In 1954, Kirin overtook them and stayed on top for forty-four years. By the 1970s, Kirin's share had reached approximately 60% — and reportedly reduced advertising from 1974 to 1978 for fear of antitrust action (though this claim is disputed, as annual reports show ad spending continued to rise; the reality may have been a relative reduction in advertising intensity rather than a complete cessation).

Why did Kirin win? The answer lies in distribution.

In the 1950s, household refrigerator ownership surged in Japan, and beer consumption shifted from izakayas to homes. Kirin was the first to recognize this change, pouring resources into home delivery and supermarket channels. Its "Kirin Lager" became synonymous with Japanese beer — just as Coca-Cola equals cola, saying "beer" meant Kirin.

Asahi had it rough during this period. As the "second-class citizen" assigned western Japan in the split, its brand power was virtually zero in the east. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, Asahi struggled to survive. In 1958, it created Japan's first canned beer, "Asahi Gold." In 1965, it developed the world's first outdoor fermentation tank. In 1971, it launched Japan's first aluminum can beer. Plenty of innovation, but none of it moved the needle.

Sapporo didn't fare much better. Although its trademark was revived in Hokkaido in 1956, went national in 1957, and the company was formally renamed "Sapporo Breweries" in 1964, its nationwide penetration was always insufficient. Hokkaido was its stronghold; beyond Hokkaido, it struggled.

A defining feature of this era: distribution was everything. Springer's research notes that products from all four major brewers were often priced identically on shelves — price competition was virtually nonexistent, and competition occurred entirely through advertising and product innovation. The products themselves were not very different — everyone was making lager, and taste differences mattered far less than distribution reach.

2.4 The Super Dry Revolution: Asahi's Comeback (1987–1998)

This is the most dramatic chapter in Japanese beer history.

In 1985, Asahi's market share fell to 9.6% — an all-time low. A company that had once held a pivotal position in the Dai-Nippon Beer era now saw its share slip into single digits, falling further and further behind the top three.

President Tsutomu Murai made a decision that seemed insane at the time: he bet the company's future on consumer research. A massive survey of 5,000 people yielded a conclusion that shocked everyone — consumers in their 20s and 30s did not want the rich, heavy taste of traditional beer. They wanted "fresh," "crisp," and "dry."

Behind this discovery lay a broader cultural shift. In 1980s Japan, consumer tastes were upgrading. The "karakuchi" (dry) aesthetic from sake culture was seeping into the beer world. Young people found traditional beer too "heavy." They wanted something that left the mouth clean and refreshed, with no lingering aftertaste.

In 1986, Hirotsugu Higuchi took over as president and drove two key initiatives with decisive execution:

First, he identified Yeast No. 508, achieving a technical breakthrough in "crisp" taste.

Second, he launched the "Freshness Campaign" — recalling all beer that had been in the market for more than three months and mandating that product must ship within 20 days of production. The recall cost reached 1 billion yen, roughly 40% of that year's profit. The board was up in arms. Higuchi shut them down with one line: "If we can't guarantee product quality, what business do we have making beer?"

In March 1987, Asahi Super Dry hit the market.

The name itself was bold — the word "Dry" had never been used in Japanese beer. It came from sake's "karakuchi" concept. Transplanting sake aesthetics onto beer was revolutionary in 1987. Super Dry was the world's first beer positioned around a "super dry" concept, creating an entirely new beer category.

The result? The target was 1 million cases; actual sales hit 13.5 million. In 1988, it surged to 75 million cases, with draft beer market share reaching 39%. In 1989, it surpassed 100 million cases, accounting for over 20% of Japan's beer sales.

A "Dry Beer War" (ドライ戦争) erupted across the Japanese beer industry. Kirin was forced to launch "Kirin Dry" in response, and Sapporo rolled out "Sapporo Dry" — but neither came close to Super Dry's impact. The war even spread internationally: Canada's Molson Dry and America's Bud Dry were both inspired by Super Dry. But all imitators only learned the surface.

Why? Because Super Dry was not a single product — it was an entire system. From yeast selection to brewing processes to freshness management to brand positioning, everything was restructured around the "Dry" concept. Asahi spent two years on R&D, a year rebuilding its supply chain, and 1 billion yen recalling expired beer — none of which latecomers could replicate.

Super Dry pulled Asahi's market share from 10% to 25%, and in 1998, Asahi overtook Kirin to become Japan's number one beer. The reversal took 11 years — astonishingly fast for a century-old industry.

The deeper significance of this revolution: it proved that in a seemingly commoditized category like beer, taste innovation can topple distribution barriers. The channel moat Kirin had built over forty years was breached by a "better-tasting" product. By 2018, Asahi Super Dry was relaunched in the UK, brewed at the Birra Peroni facility in Padua — its first European production, marking Super Dry's leap from Japanese national beer to global brand.

2.5 Kirin Strikes Back: Ichiban Shibori and Category Innovation (1990–2000)

Kirin was stunned.

After Super Dry launched in 1987, Kirin's market share began a steady decline. The company urgently formed a counterattack team, led by 39-year-old marketing manager Maeda Hitoshi.

Maeda's thinking was completely different from Asahi's. While Asahi had taken the "dry" route, Kirin did not engage head-on. Instead, it shifted to a different dimension — "purity."

He rediscovered a brewing common sense that had been overlooked for decades: in the brewing process, the first press of wort (ichiban shibori) yields the highest quality and cleanest taste. Most breweries extract wort multiple times to increase yield, but Maeda said: we'll only use the first press.

This plan encountered enormous internal resistance. Using only the first press meant plummeting yields and soaring costs. The factory said it was uneconomical; finance said it wouldn't be profitable. Maeda steeled himself and went to president Motoyama Hideyo: "We can cover the costs with premium pricing." Motoyama asked, "What if consumers won't pay?" Maeda replied, "Then we'll launch at regular price. If we lose money, it's on me."

In 1990, KIRIN Ichiban Shibori hit the market. A 100% malt beer with a mild, pure, smooth taste and a distinctive bittersweet flavor. Maeda's gamble paid off — consumers were willing to pay for "authenticity." Ichiban Shibori created differentiated competition with Super Dry: want "dry"? Choose Asahi. Want "pure"? Choose Kirin.

Maeda later developed "Kirin Tanrei," another category innovation — using the concept of "tanrei" (light and elegant) to open the female market in the happoshu segment.

Kirin found its rhythm through "category innovation" rather than "head-on price wars." While it never reclaimed the top spot, it secured second place and gradually improved its margins.

2.6 The Happoshu Revolution and Tax Arbitrage (1994–2008)

If Super Dry was a product-side revolution, happoshu was a system-side revolution.

Japan's liquor tax system is arguably the world's most complex beer taxation regime. Before 2018, the threshold for "beer" versus "happoshu" was 67% malt content; in 2018, it was lowered to 50%. Beer carried the highest tax (about 200 yen per can), happoshu was lower (about 140 yen per can), and third-category beer was the lowest.

In 1994, tax reform lowered the barrier to entry for happoshu. Suntory was the first to exploit this loophole — by adding rice, corn, and other adjuncts to reduce the malt ratio, it launched low-cost happoshu. Consumers looked at it: similar taste, much cheaper price — why not buy it?

By 2000, happoshu production accounted for 33% of Japan's total beer output. Traditional beer's share was severely eroded — beer's share of the alcohol market fell from 74.3% in 1994 to 64.6% in 2011.

In 2003, the government panicked — happoshu was eating too much into tax revenue, so it raised the happoshu tax. The beer companies were smarter: you tax happoshu, we'll invent "third-category beer." Sapporo's Draft One used pea protein to completely replace malt, pioneering the third-category beer segment.

In 2008, third-category beer sales surpassed happoshu for the first time. Consumer logic was simple: whatever you call it, cheaper is better.

The consequences of this tax arbitrage were catastrophic. Japanese beer-type beverage consumption declined dramatically during this period. It wasn't that the Japanese stopped drinking; they shifted to cheaper alternatives — happoshu, third-category beer, and canned cocktails (chuhai).

Every tax hike spawned a cheaper category. Every cheaper category eroded traditional beer's foundation. Only with the 2026 tax unification (all beer types taxed uniformly at 54.25 yen/350ml) would this vicious cycle finally end — but by then, the Japanese beer market would be unrecognizable.

Note: Regarding specific consumption figures, different sources show significant discrepancies in scope and methodology. The Paper (澎湃新闻) reported figures of approximately 70.57 million liters (1994) and 34.08 million liters (2005), but converting these to kiloliters (705.7 thousand kL) yields a figure an order of magnitude smaller than Japan's 1994 beer-type production of approximately 7.17 million kL. The original source's scope (whether it includes happoshu, third-category beer, imports, etc.) and unit conversion may differ from standard production statistics; the figures here serve only as a directional trend reference. For precise data, please consult official statistics from Japan's National Tax Agency. In 2020, Japan's total alcoholic beverage consumption was approximately 7.828 billion liters (Sina Finance data), with beer-type products accounting for the largest share.

2.7 Sapporo's Predicament: The "Building Company" and Marginalization (2000s–2010s)

While Asahi and Kirin were locked in fierce combat, what was Sapporo doing?

Its attention had drifted to another field — real estate.

Sapporo was long derided by the industry as the "Sapporo Building Company." The numbers from 2006 tell the story: liquor business recurring profit was 900 million yen, while the real estate business generated 3.7 billion yen. Selling beer was a side business; collecting rent was the main gig.

This wasn't by design. The problem was that Sapporo had few cards to play in the beer market: it failed to produce a comparable innovation during the Super Dry revolution; its Draft One market share was captured by Kirin during the happoshu wave; its brand power in western Japan lagged far behind Asahi and Suntory; and in 2008, Suntory overtook Sapporo, dropping it from third to fourth in the industry.

Sapporo's only bright spot was Sapporo Classic — a 100% malt beer sold exclusively in Hokkaido. Since its launch in 1985, this product had maintained its Hokkaido-only exclusivity, with fierce local loyalty. Some tourists even traveled to Hokkaido specifically to taste Classic. But the "Hokkaido exclusive" strategy was both a brand differentiator and a growth ceiling.

After switching to a holding company structure in 2003, Sapporo began searching for a way out. In 2006, it acquired Canada's Sleeman Breweries. In 2017, it acquired Anchor Brewing in San Francisco (one of the birthplaces of America's craft beer movement). In 2022, it acquired Stone Brewing (one of America's largest craft brands, now operating at sapporo-stonebrewing.com).

The logic behind these acquisitions was clear: if you can't win domestically, go buy overseas. But integration has been disappointing — Stone Brewing announced in late 2024 that it would withdraw from 50 export markets to focus on the US domestic market. In Q1 2025, Sapporo's operating loss narrowed, but its net loss expanded to 4.2 billion yen, primarily due to weak North American operations.

2.8 Kirin's Diversification Pivot (2007–Present)

In 2007, Kirin celebrated its 100th anniversary. This milestone became a strategic inflection point.

In 2008, the company changed its name from "Kirin Brewery Company" to "Kirin Holdings." The name change reflected a strategic shift — Kirin was no longer content to be just a brewer. It wanted to become a corporate group with three pillars: alcoholic beverages, non-alcoholic beverages, and health foods.

The acquisition trail grew longer — Lion Nathan in Australia (2009, the country's second-largest brewer), a 14.7% stake in Singapore's F&N (2010), and Blackmores (2023) — but the core logic remained constant: using beer's cash flow to fund diversification.

But there was trouble overseas. Kirin's joint venture in Myanmar, Myanmar Brewery (acquired for $506 million in 2015), fell into crisis after the 2021 military coup. Kirin announced its withdrawal from the Myanmar market in 2022 — this failed overseas investment was likely a significant factor in the 48.3% plunge in FY2024 net profit.

However, Kirin holds a unique card: in Japan, it has the license to produce Budweiser and exclusive import rights for Heineken and Pilsner Urquell. This means Kirin is not just a competitor with its own brands, but also a "gatekeeper" for international brands in the Japanese market.

In April 2025, Kirin launched "Ichiban White Beer," targeting consumers who rarely drink beer or purchase less than once a month — showing that Kirin continues to seek growth through category innovation.

Is this strategy working? The data shows: Kirin's FY2024 gross margin reached 45.1%, the highest among the Big Four. But overseas revenue accounted for only 26.5%, far below Asahi's 51.1%. Kirin's profitability is strong, but its globalization lags.

2.9 Asahi's Global Gamble (2016–Present)

Asahi's globalization strategy has been the most aggressive move in the Japanese beer industry over the past decade.

In 2016, after AB InBev acquired SABMiller for $107 billion and was forced to divest assets, Asahi seized the opportunity. In two tranches, it consumed SABMiller's European operations: the first batch, for approximately 2.55 billion euros, covered beer operations in Italy, the Netherlands, and the UK, yielding the Peroni Nastro Azzurro and Grolsch brands; the second batch, for approximately 7.3 billion euros, covered five Central and Eastern European countries (Czech Republic, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Hungary), yielding Pilsner Urquell (the world's first pilsner), Tyskie, Lech, Dreher, and Ursus. The deal was struck at 14.8x EBITDA. Combined, the two acquisitions totaled approximately 10 billion euros (~$11 billion).

In 2019, Asahi acquired AB InBev's Australian subsidiary, Carlton & United Breweries (CUB), for approximately A$16 billion (~US$11.3 billion), gaining brands like Victoria Bitter and Carlton Dry. RTÉ News called it one of the largest beer acquisitions in Australian history.

In January 2024, Asahi acquired US-based Octopi Brewing, preparing to produce Super Dry domestically in North America. PR Newswire reported that Octopi would continue under current president Isaac Showaki but would require additional investment to meet Super Dry's production standards, supervised by Japanese brewmasters.

The impact was immediate: FY2024 total revenue reached ¥2,939.4 billion (~US$19.7 billion), operating profit ¥269.1 billion, and net profit ¥192.1 billion (+17.1% YoY). Overseas revenue exceeded 51% — overseas revenue surpassed domestic for the first time. Market shares in the Czech Republic, Poland, and Romania reached 49%, 36%, and 39% respectively.

Even more striking was the margin trajectory: in 2010, overseas operations were still losing ¥5.14 billion; by 2023, they were generating ¥155.29 billion in operating profit, a 2017–2023 CAGR of 28.3%. Since 2021, overseas operating margins have surpassed domestic levels.

Asahi CEO Katsuki Atsushi's strategic vision is clear: Japan's aging demographics are irreversible, and domestic beer consumption will only continue to decline. The only path forward is to become a truly global company. Super Dry is its global weapon; Europe and Oceania are its main battlegrounds. Asahi Group has also set a 2050 carbon neutrality target, switching multiple factories to renewable energy and becoming Japan's first food company to issue green bonds in 2020.

2.10 The Underlying Logic of Diverging Fortunes

Looking back over 150 years, the three companies have traced entirely different trajectories:

Asahi: From industry bottom to global number one. The critical turning point was Super Dry in 1987 — a life-or-death innovation. Since then, Asahi has demonstrated remarkable strategic consistency: first use Super Dry to reclaim the Japanese market, then use M&A to open global markets. Its core competency is "finding the right direction in dire straits, then going all in."

Kirin: From forty-four-year champion to being overtaken. Kirin's story is that of a "defender." It dominated during the distribution era but was surpassed by Asahi in the product innovation era. It fought back with Ichiban Shibori but never regained its absolute advantage. Its pivot was rational — since it couldn't monopolize beer, it would become a diversified group.

Sapporo: From industry pioneer to marginalization. Sapporo is Japan's oldest beer brand (1876), yet it fell behind step by step in subsequent competition. Trapped by its "building company" label, limited by regional brand ceilings, and dragged down by overseas acquisition integration challenges. Its problem isn't a lack of good products (Classic and Yebisu are both good beers), but a failure to turn good products into good business.

---

III. Horizontal Analysis: The Competitive Map

3.1 Market Structure: Layered Competition Under an Oligopoly

The 2023 Japanese beer market (including happoshu and third-category beer) had a starkly clear structure:

Company	Market Share	Positioning
Asahi	34%	Industry leader, globalization frontrunner
Kirin	31%	Century-old runner-up, diversified group
Suntory	18%	Latecomer, chuhai king
Sapporo	11%	Marginal player, North American bet

CR4 reached 94% — meaning new entrants have virtually no chance. Springer's academic research notes that despite extreme market concentration, Japanese beer firms are not pure monopolists — they compete fiercely through advertising and product innovation. It's just that this competition doesn't manifest in prices: different brands within the same category are often priced identically on shelves.

But the gap between Sapporo's 11% and Asahi's 34% is threefold. This is not competition on equal terms. The real structure is "two strong, one challenger, one weak": Asahi and Kirin are the first tier, Suntory is the second-tier pursuer, and Sapporo is the third-tier struggler.

Interestingly, in the happoshu category, the picture is entirely different: Kirin leads overwhelmingly with 55.2%, while Asahi has only 24.5%. This shows that Kirin's brand power is actually stronger in the value segment — Ichiban Shibori's "purity" image and Kirin Tanrei's "light" image cover both the premium and budget extremes.

3.2 Financial Comparison: Who's Really Making Money?

FY2023 financial data reveals a fascinating fact: the highest gross margin doesn't belong to the industry leader.

Metric	Asahi	Kirin	Sapporo	Suntory
FY2024 Revenue (¥ billion)	2,939.4	2,338.4	~550 (est.)	3,079.7
FY2024 Operating Profit (¥ billion)	269.1	211.0	Loss-making	328.9
FY2024 Net Profit (¥ billion)	192.1	58.2	Loss-making	176.2
Gross Margin (FY2023)	36.1%	45.1%	30.2%	40.1%
Net Margin (FY2023)	6.0%	7.0%	1.7%	6.9%
EBITDA Margin (FY2023)	14.1%	13.7%	6.9%	14.0%

Kirin's gross margin is 9 percentage points higher than Asahi's. This is partly attributable to Kirin's product mix — premium all-malt products like Ichiban Shibori naturally carry higher margins. However, it's important to note that Kirin Holdings is a diversified group with high-margin businesses including pharmaceuticals (Kyowa Kirin) and health supplements (Blackmores). The 45.1% figure is a consolidated group number and cannot be attributed solely to beer.

Asahi's EBITDA margin is the highest (14.1%), indicating the best operational efficiency. Asahi wins through scale: revenue more than five times Sapporo's, with economies of scale diluting fixed costs.

Sapporo's numbers are the weakest: 30.2% gross margin, 1.7% net margin, 6.9% EBITDA margin — all at the bottom. This isn't just an "industry fourth" problem; its profitability is simply not on the same level.

Kirin's FY2024 net profit plunged 48.3% to ¥58.2 billion, likely related to impairment losses from its Myanmar operations — a warning about the risks of overseas expansion.

3.3 Product Portfolio: Three Competitive Philosophies

Asahi: Single-Product Powerhouse

Super Dry alone props up the entire group. The advantage of this strategy is extreme brand concentration — when global consumers think of Japanese beer, the first name that comes to mind is Asahi Super Dry. Since helping Asahi reach the top in 1998, Super Dry has maintained its position as Japan's best-selling beer for nearly 30 years. In July 2025, a Super Dry 3.5 low-calorie variant was launched ("70% less sugar, 40% less energy"), targeting health-conscious consumers. The downside is having all eggs in one basket. Asahi does have other products (Prime Time, Dry Zero, Style Free), but they're all supporting actors compared to Super Dry's scale.

Kirin: Category Coverage

Ichiban Shibori for premium, Kirin Lager for classics, Kirin Tanrei for happoshu, Kirin Free for non-alcoholic, Hyoketsu for chuhai — Kirin's product line covers virtually every category and price point. In 2025, it launched Ichiban White Beer, targeting non-core beer consumers. The risk of this strategy is brand dilution; the benefit is hedged bets. In 2023, Kirin even used generative AI to analyze five years of consumer interview data to develop new Hyoketsu products — a blend of marketing gimmick and genuine R&D efficiency gains.

Sapporo: Regional + Craft

Sapporo's product strategy is the most "distinctive": Sapporo Classic is sold only in Hokkaido (scarcity marketing or strategic conservatism?), Yebisu targets the premium segment (brewed with German-imported ingredients and Reinheitsgebot methods, popular with foreign visitors), Black Label serves the mass market, and Draft One covers third-category beer. In recent years, it has also entered the craft segment through the acquisitions of Anchor and Stone Brewing. The problem: craft acquisition integration has fallen far short of expectations.

Suntory: Premium Malt's Premium Breakthrough

Worth noting is Suntory's The Premium Malt's — this premium pilsner-style beer has won consecutive gold medals at European competitions and holds a strong position in the premium beer segment. Suntory also launched "All Free" non-alcoholic beer, with a formula upgrade in January 2024 emphasizing "drinking satisfaction" and a "clean aftertaste."

3.4 Brewing Philosophy: Three Approaches to Taste

Dimension	Asahi	Kirin	Sapporo
Core Process	Dry process (sake-inspired)	Ichiban Shibori (first press)	Traditional lager + innovative substitutes
Taste Profile	Dry, crisp, strong carbonation	Rich, pure, malt-forward	Balanced, smooth, mild bitter finish
Innovation	Can simulating draft, de-alcoholization tech	AI-assisted brewing recipes	Pea protein malt substitute
Ingredients	Barley malt + rice adjuncts	100% barley malt (Ichiban)	All-malt (Classic/Yebisu) or substitutes

Three brewing philosophies correspond to three consumption occasions: Asahi's Dry taste pairs with food — sushi, barbecue, hot pot — instantly refreshing the palate. Kirin's Ichiban Shibori suits solo drinking — savoring the malt aroma slowly. Sapporo's Black Label fits everyday drinking — no particular occasion required.

Kirin's "AI brewing" is interesting. Announced in 2017 for beer production, it was further advanced in 2023 with generative AI for accelerated product development. Using AI to analyze flavor, aroma, color, and alcohol content to rapidly generate recipes — the technology is currently more marketing than substance, but it represents a direction: future beer recipes may genuinely be determined by algorithms.

3.5 International Strategies: Three Paths to Overseas Markets

Asahi: Acquisition-Driven Globalization

Asahi's overseas strategy is simple and aggressive — buy, buy, buy. From 2016 to 2020, it made intensive acquisitions of SABMiller's European operations (two tranches totaling ~10 billion euros) and AB InBev's Australian business (A$16 billion), cumulatively investing over$17 billion. The advantage of this strategy is speed: acquisitions immediately yield market share, distribution networks, and brand equity. The disadvantage is heavy debt and high integration risk.

The numbers speak: FY2024 overseas revenue exceeded 51%, making it the only Japanese brewer with overseas revenue surpassing domestic. The 49% share in Czech Republic, 36% in Poland, and 39% in Romania — all came through acquisition.

Kirin: Organic + Selective Acquisition

Kirin's overseas approach is more cautious. Its core asset is Lion Nathan (Australia's second-largest brewer, acquired in 2009) and its investment in San Miguel in the Philippines. The 2023 acquisition of Blackmores extended its reach into health supplements. Overseas revenue accounts for 26.5%, mainly from Oceania and Southeast Asian markets. But the Myanmar lesson (forced exit in 2022) shows that even "cautious" overseas expansion can go wrong.

Sapporo: North American Craft Focus

Sapporo's overseas path is the narrowest — essentially focused only on North America. Acquisitions of Sleeman (Canada, 2006), Anchor Brewing (San Francisco craft pioneer, 2017), and Stone Brewing (one of America's largest craft brands, 2022) — all concentrated in North America. Overseas revenue accounts for 23.1%, the smallest among the three. And Stone Brewing's announcement in late 2024 that it would exit 50 export markets is a blow to Sapporo's international ambitions.

Dimension	Asahi	Kirin	Sapporo
Overseas Revenue Share	51.1%	26.5%	23.1%
Key Markets	Europe + Oceania	US + Oceania	North America
Strategy Style	Aggressive acquisitions	Organic + selective	Craft-focused
Overseas Margins	Surpassed domestic	Surpassed domestic	Integration in progress

3.6 Brand Marketing: Three Narrative Approaches

Asahi: Modern + International

Super Dry's brand image is "modern Japan" — clean, crisp, international. As the official partner of the 2019 Rugby World Cup and a global partner of City Football Group (Manchester City's parent company) since 2022, Asahi's sponsorship targets are all global IPs. Its tagline "Asahi Super Dry, sono kando wo" emphasizes experience and feeling, not the product itself.

Kirin: Craftsmanship + Authenticity

Ichiban Shibori's marketing core is "process" — extracting only the first press of wort. This selling point elevates beer from "beverage" to "artisanal product." Kirin's ads frequently feature close-ups of brewmasters, barley fields, and golden liquid, emphasizing "visible quality." Its SG&A expense ratio is 35.7% (highest among the Big Four), indicating massive investment in brand building.

Sapporo: History + Region

Sapporo's brand narrative revolves around "history" and "Hokkaido." Founded in 1876 as Japan's oldest beer brand, with the North Star trademark representing the Hokkaido Development Commission's emblem. Sapporo Classic's "Hokkaido exclusive" strategy creates scarcity and reinforces regional identity. But the problem is: consumers outside Hokkaido don't buy in.

3.7 Craft Beer's Impact and Response

Japan's craft beer movement began in 1994 — Ryouji Oda founded the Japan Craft Beer Association and lobbied the government to lower the annual production threshold from 2 million liters to 60,000 liters. This change spawned approximately 310 microbreweries. Springer's academic paper documented this history in detail: "the 1994 deregulation gave birth to microbreweries."

But craft's development has not been smooth sailing. Springer's research notes that microbreweries "face severe price competition and low profitability and have been on the decline over the past two decades." Consumers generally viewed craft beer as low-quality "souvenirs." It wasn't until 2014 that craft experienced a renaissance. By 2023, Japan had 805 microbreweries. 2025 marks the 30th anniversary of Japanese craft beer, with "Beer Festival 2025" showcasing over 700 varieties.

Representative craft brands include: Coedo Brewery (Saitama, refined Japanese style), Baird Beer (Shizuoka, American craft), Kiuchi Brewery/Hitachino Nest (Ibaraki, internationally renowned), Ginga Kogen Beer (Iwate, wheat beer), and Otaru Beer (Hokkaido, German style).

But the Big Four's attitude is "strategically important, tactically acquisitive":

• Asahi launched premium lines like Prime Time and acquired US-based Octopi Brewing in 2024
• Kirin uses limited seasonal products (Spring Cherry Blossom, Summer Super Rich, Autumn Flavor, Winter Fresh Hop) to create a craft feel
• Sapporo is most aggressive — directly purchasing two iconic American craft breweries

Springer's conclusion is thought-provoking: "Craft beer has become a boom in Japan since 2014; however, major four breweries started to enter the craft beer market, leaving microbreweries' future situation unpredictable."

3.8 Substitute Beverages: The Real Enemy Is Not Each Other

If craft is a "distant worry," chuhai (canned cocktails) is the "immediate threat."

Liqueur-based beverages (リキュール, including chuhai and other canned cocktails) have surged from 6.4% to 29.6% of Japan's annual alcohol consumption — nearly one-third. This means: one in every three drinks consumed is a canned cocktail.

The logic behind chuhai's rise is simple: diverse flavors, attractive packaging, low alcohol content, and cheap. It precisely targets the needs of young women and light drinkers — people who didn't drink much beer anyway, and now have a better option.

Suntory is the undisputed king in this segment. While Asahi and Kirin also have chuhai product lines, they're far behind Suntory. This has reshaped the competitive landscape: the Big Four's battleground is no longer just beer, but the entire alcoholic beverage market.

A 2025 survey showed that 25% of Japanese consumers prefer low-alcohol or no-alcohol beverages, rising to 56% among the 25–34 age group. Asahi Group even projects that non-alcoholic beer will account for half of sales by 2040.

3.9 2026 Tax Unification: Rewriting the Rules

This is the biggest institutional change in the Japanese beer industry in nearly thirty years.

In 2026, all beer-type products will be taxed uniformly at 54.25 yen/350ml. The three-phase unification plan announced in 2017 has reached its final step: Phase 1 in 2020 lowered beer taxes while raising happoshu/third-category taxes; Phase 2 in 2023 raised the happoshu tax from 37.80 yen to 47.00 yen per 350ml; Phase 3 in 2026 achieves full unification.

On April 15, 2026, Japan further published draft amendments to the Liquor Tax Act and related administrative notifications, deleting the ingredient weight calculation clause for happoshu definition and simplifying bookkeeping obligations.

The impact varies by company:

Asahi: The biggest beneficiary. Super Dry is mainstream beer, and tax reductions directly boost its competitiveness. Kirin: A beneficiary. Ichiban Shibori is also mainstream beer, and Kirin's happoshu share isn't large. Sapporo: Benefits the least. Draft One is a flagship third-category beer product; after tax unification, its price advantage will disappear.

But the real suspense is: after happoshu and third-category beer lose their price advantage, will consumers return to mainstream beer, or shift directly to chuhai and non-alcoholic beverages? If the latter, Suntory will be the biggest winner.

3.10 Japanese Beer in the Global Context

How do Japanese companies measure up on the global beer industry stage?

Company	FY2024 Revenue	Currency
AB InBev	$59.77 billion	USD
Heineken	€35.96 billion	EUR
Suntory	¥3,079.7 billion	JPY
Asahi	¥2,939.4 billion	JPY
Kirin	¥2,338.4 billion	JPY
Molson Coors	$11.63 billion	USD
Carlsberg	DKK 75 billion	DKK

Asahi's revenue of approximately $19.7 billion is approaching Carlsberg's scale. But compared to AB InBev's$59.7 billion, there is still a threefold gap. The globalization of Japanese beer companies has only just begun.

An interesting academic finding: Japanese beer retail prices are approximately 62% higher than in the US — with the majority of this differential attributable to liquor taxes. Springer's research notes that persistent non-tariff barriers exist in the Japanese beer market. After the 2026 tax unification, this price gap may narrow.

---

IV. Cross-Analysis Insights

4.1 How History Shaped Today's Competitive Positions

The reason Asahi sits atop the industry today is not Super Dry itself, but the darkest hour of 1985 when its share hit 9.6%. Precisely because it had already hit rock bottom did Tsutomu Murai have the courage to bet on consumer research, and Hirotsugu Higuchi dare to spend 1 billion yen on the "Freshness Campaign." Desperation is the best catalyst for innovation.

The reason Kirin was overtaken can also be traced to history. Forty-four years of dominance gave it "channel dependency syndrome" — the belief that as long as distribution was deep enough and the brand strong enough, a slightly inferior product didn't matter. Super Dry proved this wrong. The greatest enemy of the incumbent is not the competitor, but its own inertia.

Sapporo's predicament is rooted in the 1949 split. Assigned eastern Japan, its brand power was inherently weaker than the nationally distributed Kirin and Asahi. Every subsequent strategic choice (Hokkaido exclusivity, happoshu following, craft acquisitions) reinforced this regional limitation. Origins determine destiny — and Sapporo embodies this maxim.

4.2 The "Origin Determinism" of the Three Companies

Comparing the three companies on a timeline reveals an interesting pattern: each company's competitive style today can be traced back to its "origin moment."

Asahi's origin is the Super Dry revolution — turning the tables through product innovation in a desperate situation. So Asahi's DNA to this day is "innovation + all in." Whether launching Super Dry raw beer cans or making a massive bet on European acquisitions, Asahi's style is always "find the direction, then commit fully." The 7.3 billion euros spent acquiring SABMiller's European operations is the same decision-making pattern as spending 1 billion yen to recall expired beer in 1987.

Kirin's origin is the "Ichiban Shibori counterattack" — finding its rhythm through category innovation while at a disadvantage. So Kirin's DNA is "differentiation + diversification." It doesn't seek absolute dominance of a single product; it seeks comprehensive coverage across its product portfolio. The 45.1% gross margin — highest among the Big Four — is the financial return of this strategy.

Sapporo's origin is "Hokkaido exclusive" — finding relevance through regional strength. So Sapporo's DNA is "regional + distinctive." Whether Sapporo Classic or craft acquisitions, Sapporo is always seeking a "differentiated but niche" positioning. The problem: niche positioning has a low ceiling.

4.3 Vertical Comparison of Competitors: The Origins of Three Overseas Paths

The three companies' paths to internationalization are starkly different, and these differences are equally rooted in history:

Asahi's aggressive overseas expansion stems from the "gambling spirit" of the Super Dry revolution. The 1987 all-in succeeded, giving Asahi the confidence that "as long as the direction is right, we'll bet big." Spending over $17 billion on European and Australian acquisitions in 2016–2020 is fundamentally the same decision-making pattern as spending 1 billion yen to recall expired beer in 1987.

Kirin's cautious overseas expansion stems from the lesson of being overtaken. After losing to Asahi in 1987, Kirin learned "don't put all your eggs in one basket." So it diversified beyond beer into pharmaceuticals and health foods, and chose a "organic growth + selective acquisition" approach for overseas expansion. But the Myanmar lesson shows that even "cautious" overseas expansion can derail.

Sapporo's craft-focused overseas expansion stems from the anxiety of long-term marginalization. Unable to compete with Asahi and Kirin in the domestic market, it had to seek opportunities abroad. But Sapporo lacks Asahi's M&A integration capability and Kirin's diversified foundation, so it could only take the "buy craft brands" differentiation route. The problem: integrating craft brands is far more difficult than mass-market beer brands. Stone Brewing's exit from 50 export markets is proof.

4.4 Historical Roots of Strengths and Weaknesses

Asahi's core strength — brand globalization capability: Rooted in Super Dry's taste innovation. Super Dry became a global brand because the "Dry" concept is cross-culturally comprehensible — whether Japanese, European, or American, everyone understands what "dry" means. By contrast, Kirin's "Ichiban Shibori" (first press) is too abstract for overseas consumers.

Kirin's core strength — highest group gross margin (45.1%): Partly rooted in Ichiban Shibori's premium positioning — when Kirin decided in 1990 to "use only the first press of wort and launch at regular price," it was betting that consumers would pay a premium for "authenticity." Also thanks to its diversification: pharmaceuticals and health supplement businesses naturally carry higher margins than beer, pulling up the group average.

Sapporo's core weakness — scale and profitability both weak: Rooted in the 1949 split's "eastern Japan" designation. Regional limitations led to insufficient scale, insufficient scale led to inadequate distribution investment, inadequate distribution led to declining share, declining share led to thin margins — a self-reinforcing vicious cycle. Sapporo tried to break this cycle with "Hokkaido exclusive" and "craft acquisitions," but with limited effect.

4.5 Future Scenarios: Three Scripts

Scenario 1 (Most Likely): The Strong Stay Strong, Gap Widens

Asahi continues expanding in Europe and Oceania, with Super Dry accelerating penetration through US domestic production at Octopi Brewing. Kirin maintains steady performance through diversification and organic growth. Sapporo continues losing money in North American craft integration and may eventually be forced to divest some overseas assets.

Supporting logic: Asahi's overseas revenue already exceeds 51%, and European margins continue improving. Once this flywheel spins, it's hard to reverse. Kirin's "beer + pharma + health" troika may not be exciting but is stable enough. Sapporo's problem is that it lacks both Asahi's M&A integration capability and Kirin's diversification foundation. Stone Brewing's exit from 50 export markets has already exposed integration difficulties.

Scenario 2 (Most Dangerous): Tax Shock + Accelerating Substitute Erosion

After the 2026 tax unification, happoshu and third-category beer lose their price advantage. Consumers don't return to mainstream beer but accelerate their shift to chuhai and non-alcoholic beverages. Suntory becomes the biggest winner. Asahi and Kirin's competition in the traditional beer market becomes a zero-sum game.

Supporting logic: Liqueur-based beverages have already risen from 6.4% to 29.6%. If this trend accelerates after tax unification, the "tax reduction dividend" for mainstream beer may be consumed by substitutes. 25% of Japanese consumers already prefer low/no-alcohol beverages, rising to 56% in the 25–34 age group. The global non-alcoholic beer market exceeded $13 billion in 2023.

Scenario 3 (Most Optimistic): Craft + Premium Creates New Growth

Japan's craft beer market grows at a 13.14% CAGR, with major breweries entering the premium segment through acquisitions and in-house craft brands. The 2026 tax unification eliminates inter-category price distortions, and consumers refocus on "quality" over "price." The three companies shift from "share competition" to "value competition," and industry-wide margins improve.

Supporting logic: Japan's 805 microbreweries prove consumer demand for differentiated products. If the majors can learn to "think craft, produce mass" — like Asahi's Prime Time and Kirin's seasonal limited series — the industry may break out of the "volume down, price up" dilemma.

4.6 Cultural Dimension: Beer as a Metaphor for Japanese Society

Japan's 150-year beer history is, in some ways, a microcosm of Japanese society.

The Meiji era's "civilization and enlightenment" transformed beer from a foreign import into a necessity. The postwar breakup and reconstruction mirrored the social transformation under MacArthur. The 1987 Super Dry Revolution corresponded to the consumer upgrading on the eve of the bubble economy. The rise of happoshu and third-category beer epitomized consumers' pursuit of value during the "Lost Three Decades."

Today, young people don't drink beer — they drink chuhai, non-alcoholic beverages, and craft beer. The social ritual of "toriaezu biiru!" (I'll have a beer first!) is being replaced by "everyone orders what they like." In 2022, Japan's National Tax Agency even launched the "Sake Viva!" contest — soliciting ideas from 20–39-year-olds on how to promote alcohol consumption. The very existence of this initiative shows how serious the problem has become.

The three companies' responses to this change are characteristically Japanese: Asahi chose to "go global," Kirin chose to "diversify" (health foods), and Sapporo chose to "be distinctive" (craft + regional). Three paths, fundamentally three answers to the question "How should Japanese companies survive in the era of globalization?"

There is no standard answer. But history tells us: in the beer industry, those who dare to redefine the rules of the game win — whether it was Asahi redefining beer through taste in 1987, the craft movement redefining brewing through individuality in 1994, or the 2026 tax unification redefining competition through fairness.

Who will be the next to redefine the game?

---

Data Reliability Note

The data in this report comes from sources of varying reliability. Readers should note the following distinctions when citing:

High reliability (primary sources)

• FY2024 financial data (revenue, operating profit, net profit) for each company: sourced from respective annual reports/IR disclosures (Asahi Group Holdings FY2024, Kirin Holdings FY2024, Suntory Holdings FY2024, Sapporo Holdings FY2024)
• Acquisition transaction values: from transaction announcements, regulatory filings, and authoritative financial media (RTÉ, PR Newswire, etc.)
• Market concentration (CR4) and competitive behavior analysis: from peer-reviewed Springer academic studies

Medium reliability (secondary sources but cross-verifiable)

• Market share data (Asahi 34%/37%, Kirin 31%/34%, etc.): figures vary slightly across sources; this report uses data from Xingye Securities research and Sina Finance reporting, which differ from Asahi Group's official website citing "Asahi, with a 37% market share" (scope differences: whether happoshu and third-category beer are included)
• Industry trend data (happoshu share, liqueur share, etc.): from Chinese financial media, original data from Japan's National Tax Agency and Ministry of Finance statistics
• Microbrewery count: from Statista and Japan Craft Beer Association

Lower reliability (cite with caution)

• Specific consumption volume figures (70.57M / 34.08M liters): from The Paper (澎湃新闻), with questionable scope and unit conversion
• Super Dry specific sales figures (13.5M / 75M / 100M cases): widely cited but lacking direct confirmation from Asahi Group annual reports
• Liqueur share rising from 6.4% to 29.6%: from Chinese media, original survey source unverified
• 2025 low/no alcohol preference survey (25% / 56%): original surveyor and methodology unverified

Financial data note: FY2024 financial figures (revenue, operating profit, net profit) are from each company's 2024 annual report (fiscal year ending December 2024). Gross margin, net margin, and EBITDA margin are FY2023 figures calculated per Xingye Securities research. Kirin's 45.1% gross margin is a consolidated group figure (including pharmaceutical and health supplement businesses) and cannot be attributed solely to beer operations.

---

V. Sources

Academic

1. SpringerLink — "Detecting Market Competition in the Japanese Beer Industry" (30-year competition analysis) https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10842-013-0166-9
2. SpringerLink — "Government Regulations and Microbreweries in Japan" (craft regulations & tax) https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-58235-1_16

International News

3. RTÉ News — "AB InBev agrees Australian unit sale to Japan's Asahi" (Asahi's A$16B CUB acquisition) https://www.rte.ie/news/business/2019/0719/1063968-anheuser-busch-inbev-aussie-sale/
4. VICE — "Young People Don't Drink as Much as They Used To. Japan's Tax Agency Is Worried" (Japan's drinking decline) https://www.vice.com/en/article/japan-encourages-drinking-alcohol-consumption/
5. SHINE — "Asahi drinks to US7.8b brewing deal" (Asahi's SABMiller European acquisition) https://archive.shine.cn/business/consumer/Asahi-drinks-to-US78b-brewing-deal/shdaily.shtml
6. PR Newswire Asia — Asahi Octopi Brewing Acquisition (Asahi acquires US Octopi Brewing) https://www.prnasia.com/lightnews/lightnews-1-102-69827.shtml

Corporate Official Sources

7. Asahi Group Holdings — History https://www.asahigroup-holdings.com/company/history/
8. Asahi Group Holdings — Business Overview https://www.asahigroup-holdings.com/business/
9. KIRIN China — History https://www.kirinchina.cn/history.html
10. KIRIN ICHIBAN Website http://www.kirinichiban.com/
11. Sapporo Beer Website https://www.sapporobeer.com/
12. Kirin Holdings Sustainability https://www.kirinholdings.com/en/impact/alcohol/

Data & Statistics

13. Statista — Sapporo Holdings Revenue https://www.statista.com/statistics/961424/sapporo-holdings-net-sales/
14. Statista — Number of Microbreweries in Japan https://www.statista.com/statistics/1171283/japan-number-microbreweries/
15. World Bank — Japan Per Capita Alcohol Consumption https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.ALC.PCAP.LI?locations=JP
16. Global Alcohol Companies FY2024 Financial Compilation https://finance.sina.cn/2025-03-12/detail-inepiyiv1927448.d.html

Industry Analysis & Research Reports

17. Industrial Securities — "Beer Special Report IV: Latest Analysis of Japanese Beer Leaders" (2024.05) https://www.sohu.com/a/780193057_121699314
18. Sina Finance — Research on Japanese Beer Companies' Overseas Expansion https://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/jync/2024-08-19/doc-inckhrza3519997.shtml
19. Allied Market Research — Asia-Pacific Beer Market https://www.alliedmarketresearch.com/asia-pacific-beer-market

In-Depth Reports

20. The Paper (澎湃新闻) — Asahi Beer's Taste Revolution https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_20825581
21. NetEase — The Birth of Kirin Ichiban Shibori https://www.163.com/dy/article/KEJKMFNT052597OI.html
22. Toutiao — Asahi's Competitive Strategy https://www.toutiao.com/article/6836281843713573387/

Latest Developments

23. NetEase — Three Japanese Beer Giants' 2025 Q1 Results https://www.163.com/dy/article/K0I5DPKR0522BL6H.html
24. Chinese Ministry of Commerce — Japan Liquor Tax Act Draft Amendment (2026.04) http://chinawto.mofcom.gov.cn/article/jsbl/dtxx/202604/20260403627500.shtml
25. FoodTalks — Asahi Acquires Octopi Brewing https://www.foodtalks.cn/flash/18859
26. Stockstar — Stone Brewing Exits Export Markets https://jiu.stockstar.com/IG2024112600007778.shtml

Consumer & Culture

27. Sohu — Japanese Beer Industry Overview 2024 https://www.sohu.com/a/845328703_121823071
28. ENNews — Japanese Young Consumers' Low-Alcohol Preference https://www.ennews.com/news-84751.html
29. Hujiang — Japanese Beer Tax & Categories https://jp.hjenglish.com/new/p763163/
30. Jiuquan.com — World Beer Tour: Japan http://wap.jiuq.com/article.php?a_id=674&act=detail
31. quan-riben.cn — Top 6 Beers in Japan https://quan-riben.cn/en/article/1963/

Other

32. Sohu — The Origins of Japan's Beer Industry https://history.sohu.com/a/750306363_100108170
33. Zupu.cn — Sapporo Beer https://www.zupu.cn/renwu/20201016/527386.html
34. China Light Industry Network — Japan Plans to Unify Beer Taxes http://www.clii.com.cn/fbyj/201410/t20141029_3861454.html
35. BeerTengoku — English Guide to Japanese Craft Beer https://beertengoku.com/